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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf : 
Plaintiff-Respondent#: Case No. 870597-CA 
v. : 
MARIO SOTO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of theft, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978), 
in the Second Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Whether sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for theft. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978): "A person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
STATS^T QF THE CAgE 
Defendant/ Mario Soto, was charged by information with 
theftf a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-404 (1978) (R. 1). Defendant was convicted in a trial by jury 
held on October 23 and 26, 1987, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding (R. 13-16). On 
November 18, 1987, Judge Wahlquist sentenced defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 8, 1987, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Officers 
Stewart and Zaugg of the Ogden City police department were 
dispatched, in response to a call from an area resident, to a 
burglary in progress in the back lot of Wilkinson Supply Company 
(T. 19-20, 37-38).* 
Officer Zaugg, arriving first, approached the back lot 
of Wilkinson Supply Company and heard at least one person climb 
the fence, hit the ground and start to run (T. 42). He ran to the 
location of the noise and observed three lawn mowers outside a 
locked security fence (T. 40, 42). From that area he saw two 
individuals, only 15-20 yards away, running side by side down a 
nearby alley (T. 42-43) . He got a clear view of each individual 
while shining his flashlight at them (T. 42-43). Officer Zaugg, 
who was wearing a lapel microphone on his shirt, immediately 
reported his position as he began pursuit (T. 43). 
While attempting to negotiate a fence, one suspect (not 
the defendant) fell and was apprehended by Officer Zaugg (T. 45)• 
Officer Zaugg, who was then in two-way communication with Officer 
Stewart, radioed his current position and the direction of the 
suspect who was still fleeing (T. 48, 57). After handcuffing and 
taking the first suspect into custody, Officer Zaugg resumed 
pursuit of the fleeing suspect (T. 48)• 
1
 The transcript to the present appeal in not numbered into the 
record. All references denoted by (T. ) refer to the page 
number as found in the trial transcript. 
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Officer Stewart, who was able to listen to Officer 
Zaugg1s narrative of events before beginning two-way 
communication, was informed that the fleeing suspect was headed 
southbound through some houses midway through the block (T. 23).2 
Officer Stewart, already in the area described, spotted an 
individual running who matched the description given by Officer 
Zaugg,3 and began foot pursuit (T. 24-25). Officer Stewart 
observed the suspect enter a back yard which was fenced in on all 
sides (T. 25-26, 50). 
When Officer Stewart was halfway across the driveway 
toward the back of the house, Officer Zaugg came around the corner 
of the house and together both officers proceeded into the back 
yard to search for the suspect (T. 27, 50). Officer Stewart 
noticed some movement and then saw a person's legs sticking out 
from underneath a camper trailer (T. 27, 51). Officer Zaugg 
recognized the person who was pulled out from underneath the 
trailer as being the same person he had chased through the alley 
(T. 55) . 
After taking defendant into custody, the officers 
escorted the suspects back to Wilkinson Supply in order to 
continue their investigation (T. 29, 52). The officers observed 
2
 Wilkinson Supply Company is located on 3021 Grant Ave. in Ogden 
(T. 23). Events described throughout the record generally occur 
between the east and west boundries of Wall Ave and Washington 
Blvd., and the north and south boundries of 31st St. and 29th St. 
3 Officer Stewart also testified that during this time (between 
4:00 and 4:15 a.m.) he had not seen anybody in the area prior to 
observing the suspect. Additionally, he testified that he had 
not seen any cars traveling in the area of Grant and Patterson 
where the events were taking place (T. 24)• 
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that the bottom of the gate to the fence had been pulled away, 
leaving a gap of one to two-and-half feet in the fence line, and 
that three lawn mowers had been removed from the fenced area. (T. 
29-30, 52-53). 
Officer Stewart read defendant his Miranda rights, 
which defendant indicated he understood and then waived (T. 31-31, 
53-54) • At first defendant was evasive in answering questions, 
but as the interview progressed and after being confronted with 
the evidence, he attempted to provide an explanation (T. 32). 
Eventually defendant admitted to being at the scene and committing 
the theft (T. 36, 54), but claimed that he and the other arrested 
person were coerced into doing it by three or four white males who 
had threatened them earlier (T. 34, 54). When questioned further, 
defendant could not explain where he was supposed to meet these 
individuals, how they were supposed to contact him, who they were, 
or provide any description of them whatsoever (T. 34, &££., 54-55). 
Notably, defendant never denied being at the scene or what his 
intentions were while there (T. 36). 
Defendants testimony at trial differed substantially 
from the explanation he gave officers on the night of the offense. 
At trial, defendant testified that it was sheer coincidence that 
he happened to be in the area when the police observed him (T. 85-
87). Defendant claimed that he was in the area after being at a 
party (T. 69-70), and that while at the party, he got into an 
argument with his girlfriend, Josette Sanchez (T. 71, 113)• 
During the argument, Ms. Sanchez threatened to call the police if 
defendant hit her (T. 72, 118, 120). Because of the argument, Ms. 
Sanchez drove away and left the defendant to walk home. 
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Defendant claimed that he began to walk to his home in 
Riverdale; however, the route he followed took him towards 
Wilkinson Supply, not towards his home (T. 85). Defendant 
explained that he ran from the police because he was afraid that 
Ms. Sanchez had called the police (T. 71-72, 75). Cross-
examination of the defendant and his girlfriend revealed the 
inconsistencies of defendant's testimony. Most notably, that the 
alleged threat was that Ms. Sanchez would call the police i£ 
defendant hit her. Because defendant never hit her, there was no 
reason for defendant to believe that the police wanted to arrest 
him for that incident (R. 88-89, 119-120). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court for 
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is that the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict; to set 
aside a jury verdict, the evidence must be "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty 
of the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Gutierrez, 714 
P.2d 295, 295 (Utah 1986). Moreover, it is the exclusive province 
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. 
A review of the record in the present case shows that 
there is abundant evidence to support each of the requisite 




SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR THEFT. 
The standard of review applied to cases where the 
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged has been firmly 
established by the Utah Supreme Court. The Court has stated: 
Upon review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction, we will 
reverse only when such evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is guilty of the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Roberts* Utah, 711 
P.2d 235 (1985); State v. Petree, Utah, 659 
P.2d 443 (1983). Accordingly, we view the 
evidence, and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Heaps* Utah 711 P.2d 257 
(1985). So long as there is some evidence 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the offense can reasonably be 
made, the conviction will be affirmed. State 
v. Booker. Utah, 709 P.2d 342 (1985). 
State v, Gutierrez, 714 p.2d 295, 295 (Utah 1986). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) provides, "A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
£££, State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, to 
properly convict the defendant, the jury was obligated to make the 
following findings, as detailed in jury instruction number six. 
1) That on or about the 8th day August, 
1987, in Weber County, Utah, the 
following events occurred. 
2) At the above time and place, Wilkinson 
Farm Supply had lawful control and 
possession of three lawn mowers (one 
Snapper, one Jacobson, and one Honda) and 
had stored them in a fenced enclosure. 
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3) At the above time and place, the 
defendant, acting alone or in conjunction 
with another, removed the three lawn 
mowers from the enclosure with an intent 
to permanently deprive the true owners 
and/or Wilkinson Lawn Supply of their 
property* 
4) That the lawn movers [sic] have a 
combined value in excess of $250. For 
the purpose of the theft statutes, the 
value of a second-hand lawn mower is what 
the used lawn mower would sell for in the 
community on a retail basis, as is. 
(R. 20). 
The record contains abundant evidence to support the 
jury's findings for each of the requisite elements and to sustain 
defendant's conviction. 
Mark Wilkinson, owner of Wilkinson Supply Company, was 
called as the prosecution's first witness (T. 4). After 
describing the layout of his store, including the fenced yard and 
security measures taken by the store, Mr. Wilkinson testified that 
he was "absolutely, positive" that the lawn mowers were inside the 
fenced yard when the store was closed for business on August 7, 
1987 (T. 5-6, 8-9). The testimony of Mr. Wilkinson is conclusive 
evidence from which the jury could find that Wilkinson Supply 
Company had control and lawful possession of the lawn mowers for 
the date in question; the testimony of Mr. Wilkinson was 
unchallenged and uncontroverted. Even on cross-examination, 
defense counsel did not challenge Wilkinson Supply's ownership, 
control or possession of the mowers (£££, T. 14-18). In short, 
not only were there sufficient grounds for the jury to find that 
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Wilkinson Supply had control and lawful possession of the mowers, 
there was absolutely no evidence which could support a finding to 
the contrary. 
B. Pefendfln:LjcgiDflye<3 the Jtawn,jiK>wers fram 
J^fi^eDgl^SAiig^tflUi an intent t<? 
ih£_:tl)£ii--Pisp£iJty. 
At trial Mark Wilkinson, Officer Zaugg, and Officer 
Stewart each described how the gate to the fenced area had been 
pulled back from the fence line creating a gap through which the 
lawn mowers were removed (T. 8, 29-30, 52-53)• Officer Zaugg 
testified that as he approached the area, he heard at least one 
individual climb the fence, hit the ground and start to run (T. 
42). Officer Zaugg ran to the area of the noise and was able see 
two suspects, only 15-20 yards away, fleeing the scene (T. 42-43) . 
He further testified that he was able to get a "clear view of each" 
(T. 42-43). After chasing and ultimately apprehending both 
suspects, he identified the defendant as one of the two suspects 
who ran from the crime scene (T. 55). This evidence, even if 
viewed in a neutral manner rather than in a light most favorable to 
the verdict, would be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that 
the defendant was involved in the theft. 
In addition, both Officer Zaugg and Officer Stewart 
testified that defendant confessed to the commission of the crime 
when questioned at the scene (T. 36, 54). The evidence 
overwhelmingly established that defendant, either by himself or in 
conjunction with another, removed the lawn mowers from the fenced 
area of Wilkinson Supply. 
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Because an "intent to deprive" is a mental state which 
is rarely susceptible of direct proof, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that an intent to deprive "need not be proved by direct 
evidence, but may be inferred from the defendant's acts, conduct, 
statements or from the circumstances," gta£$ Y^_PaV15* 689 P.2d 5, 
12 (Utah 1984); AC££ld# Slaifi^x^ISaaSSQUi 704 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah 
1985); SJtfliS_JLL-Bxfi£]iS, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981). Sg£ 3l££, 
£iai£_y*_.Myipl)y, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, defendant's "intent to deprive" is 
clearly established by his own statements, conduct, and the 
surrounding circumstances. As previously mentioned, Officers Zaugg 
and Stewart related defendant's confession to the theft. Officer 
Zaugg testified: 
Q: [Prosecutor] At any point where he had 
admitted to you that he had gone there and 
taken the lawn mowers out, did he ever change 
his story after that? 
A; [Officer Zaugg] No, he never, never 
denied the fact of being there or what his 
intention was for being there. Merely that 
the people had threatened him . . . . 
(T. 36). Officer Stewart testified: 
He admitted to being at the scene, and also 
stated that he was involved in the theft of 
it, but he stated that something to the 
effect that they were forced or coerced 
into—into doing it—• 
(T. 54). 
Besides the defendant's confession, as related by the 
officers, his flight from the scene of a crime also creates a 
possible inference from which an intent to deprive may properly be 
found. Jgfifi £ia.fc£_YA_Bal£S, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983). The Utah 
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Supreme Court has consistently held that intent may properly be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence. Isaacson* 704 P.2d at 558; 
PayJLSr 689 P.2d at 12; EXflfiliS r 631 P.2d at 881; £££ al££, MAliphy# 
674 P.2d at 1223. 
In sum, there is clearly more than "some evidence" from 
which a finding supporting defendant's intent to deprive may be 
found. There isf in fact, overwhelming evidence. 
That the defendant offered a different version of the 
facts at trial should not dissuade this court from affirming the 
verdict. Even if this Court were to view the evidence as less 
than wholly conclusive, or recognize contradictory evidence or 
conflicting inferences, the verdict should be upheld. Siaifi-y^ 
flj0tt£ll# 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, "on conflicting 
evidence the Court is obliged to accept the version of the facts 
which supports the verdict." IsaaCfifiJQ 704 P.2d at 556, fiiiins 





Mark Wilkinson, owner of Wilkinson Supply, testified 
that he had been in business for nine years and during that entire 
time had purchased and sold lawn mowers and, in fact, had worked 
with these kinds of lawn mowers everyday. He testified that he 
was familiar with the condition of the three lawn mowers, and 
judged their retail value to be $450. (T. 9-10, 12). Because this 
was the only evidence presented at trial respecting the value of 
the lawn mowers, the jury again not only had an adequate basis for 
finding the value to be in excess of $250, any other finding would 
have been unsupported by the evidence. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that by merely being an 
owner, one i s presumed to be famil iar with the value of h i s 
possess ions and i s competent to t e s t i f y on the present market 
value of h i s property. S:fcflJt£_*jL_Elll££ll# 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 
1985) CJLtins JSJLflJfcfi-^ -fiaJLEiS # 30 Utah 2d 439, 441, 519 P.2d 247, 
248 (1974); Sialfi-Yx-BalifiDbSiafilr 652 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1982). 
In Eiircfillr the court held that an apartment manager who was 
familiar with the value and condition of the property in question, 
was in a position sufficiently analogous to that of an owner to 
permit the apartment managers testimony regarding the value of 
the property. In the present case, Mr. Wilkinson, like the 
apartment manager, was familiar with the value and condition of 
the items and was, therefore, competent to testify to the value of 
the lawn mowers. Moreover, where there is no evidence to 
contradict the valuation of the property there is ample evidence 
to support the jury's verdict. PiliSfill 711 P.2d at 245. 
£QN£LU£IQN 
On the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, this 
Court should affirm defendant's conviction for theft. "It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and it is not within 
the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgement for that 
of the fact-finder." StaJfc£_.yA_LajWB, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 
1980)* When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, it is well 
settled that the reviewing court is obligated to view the 
evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. 5JtflJtfi-i?x«Bfiapsr 711 P.2d 257 (Utah 
11-
1985) . So long a s t h e r e i s some evidence from which f ind ings of 
a l l the r e q u i s i t e e lements of the of fenses can reasonably by made, 
the c o n v i c t i o n should be af f i rmed. SJtaifi-ijLBfiflJssx, 709 P. 2d 342 
(Utah 1985) . 
The evidence in the present case is overwhelming. With 
the added presumption in favor of the jury's findings, the 
evidence clearly mandates that this Court affirm the defendant's 
conviction for theft. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that the defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
Dated this day of May, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
JARA BEARNS 
Ad^istant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CEETIFICAIE^QE.MAILINS 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Robert L. Froerer, Attorney for Defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd., 
Suite 203, Ogden, Utah 84401, this of May, 1988. 
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